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Case :'Jo.20150271
~'

IN THE

lTTJJI COURT OF :\PPE"'.\LS

CES.t\.R DiL"N1EL LOPEL
Appellant1P etitioner,
V.

OGDEN CITY,
Appellee/Respondent.
Brief of Appellee

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant Lopez appeals from the dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief, challenging his conviction for retail theft, class B misdemeanor.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code _i\nn. §78A-4-103 and Rule 65C(q) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Lopez filed a petition for post-conviction relief. He acknowledged that his
petition was not timely, but argued that he should nevertheless be allowed to
proceed because the statute of limitations should be tolled. The petition was
dismissed as untimely.
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1.

\\las the untimely petition properly dismissed because it was not filed

within one year of accrual of the cause of action~ there are no statutory exceptions.
and nothing tol1ed the one year period?
Standard of Review: .l\.n appeal from an order dismissing a petition for postconviction relief is reviewed for correctness without deference to the lower court's
vJ

conclusions oflavv. rVinward Y. State~ 2012 CT 85 ~
...,

~6~

293 P .3d 259.

Did the district court properly grant the motion to dismiss because the

petition was untimely and therefore failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted?

Standard of RevieVt,: \Vhether a trial court properly granted a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon wruch relief can be granted is a question of
~

laV\1 reviewed for correctness. Reynolds v. ·fVoodall~ 2012 UT App 206~ ~10~ 285
P.3d 7.

CONSTITCTIO:!\AL PROVISIONS. STATI~TES, A.~l\1D RULES
The following constitutional provisions. statutes. rules~ and regulations are
reproduced in Addendum A:
Statute of Limitations for post-conviction relief Utah Code i\.n.n. §78B-9-107
Preclusion of Relief, Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-106
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case concerns a petition for Post-Convjction Remedies filed by Daniel
Lopez (hereinafter referred to as ,:Lopez") requesting that his conviction in the
Ogden City Justice Court be vacated and the charges against him dismissed. (Aplt.

Bi-~ addendum A, p. 4). Ogden City (hereinafter referred as the '~City") filed a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 and 65C (k) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure since the petition was untimely. (Aplt. Br.. addendum B ). Lopez filed a
memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss. (addendum B ). Lopez~ s petition
was dismissed by the post-conviction court for being untimely without hearing.
(Aplt. Br., addendum C).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Lopez was originally charged on November 22. 2010, with Unla\\ful
Possession or Consumption of Alcohol by a Minor~ a class B misdemeanor~ and
Retail Theft, a class B misdemeanor. (Aplt. Br., addendum B, p. 1 of the docket).
At the arraignment held on November 22~ 20 l 0~ the defendant is appointed a
public defender and enters a not guilty plea. (Aplt. Br.~ addendum B, p. 2 of the
docket). The court indicates that Lopez has an ICE ho}d. 1 (Aplt. Br., addendum B,

ICE indicates the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Counsel
understands that an ICE hold means that U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement requests the defendant be released to them once the defendant is no
longer being detained by the Justice Court.
1
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p. 2 of the docket). A pre-trial conference is held on December 2. 2010. at which
time Lopez, through his public defender~ requests a continuance because Lopez~ s
parents had retained an immigration attorney. (Aplt. Br.. addendum B. p. 3 of the
docket) ..Another pre-trial conference was held on December 9, 2010~ at which
time Lopez, through his public defender, requests a bench which the court
schedules for January 28, 2011. (Aplt. Br., addendum B, p. 4 of the docket). The
court again notes that Lopez has an ICE hold. (Aplt. Br., addendum B, p. 4 of the
docket). On January 28, 2011, Lopez enters into a plea negotiation in which he
enters a guilty plea to the Retail Theft charge in exchange for the dismissal of the
Unlawful Possession or Consumption of Alcohol by a Minor charge. (Aplt. Br.,
addendum B, p. 4 of the docket). After the court sentenced Lopez, the court states
that Lopez may be released to immigration. (Aplt. Br.. addendum B, p. 5 of the
docket). Lopez did not move to withdraw his plea and did not file an appeal for a
trial de novo. (Aplt. Br., addendum B, p. 5 of the docket). On September 4, 2014,
over three years after sentencing, Lopez filed a petition for post-conviction relief.
(Aplt. Br., addendum A). Ogden City filed a motion to dismiss the petition as
untimely. (Aplt. Br.~ addendum B). Lopez opposed the City's motion to dismiss
by filing a memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss. (addendum B ). The

post-conviction court granted the City's motion to dismiss. (Aplt. Br., addendum
C). Lopez timely appealed.

4
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SCJ\1J\1.ARY OF ARGLl\1E~T
The post-conviction court properly dismissed Lopez~ s untimely petition
because he did not file it within one year of the date on wluch the cause of action
accrued. The cause of action accrued on February 28, 2011, since Lopez failed to
file an appeal for a trial de novo. The post-conviction court properly determined
that the tolling provision of the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA.) did not apply.
The Ogden City Justice Court had noted that Lopez had an ICE hold several times
during the pendency of the case. Furthermore, the Ogden City Justice Court had
continued a pre-trial conference because Lopez's parents had hired an immigration
attorney. At the date for trial, plea negotiations had been reached and Lopez was
sentenced. After sentencing Lopez, the Ogden City Justice Court indicated that he
may be released to immigration. These facts are from the Official Court Docket
from the Ogden City Justice Court and squarely contradict Lopez~ s argument for
tolling the statute of limitations.

i\RGUMENT

I.

THE POST-COI\'VICTIO~ COURT PROPERLY GRA__1\1ED THE
MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE PETTION WAS UNTIMELY
ON THE FACE OF THE PETITION.

The post-conviction court properly granted the City's motion to dismiss the
petition for post-conviction relief because it was untimely and therefore failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
5
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~i

A.

The post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition because
it was plain from the pleadings that Lopez did not file it within
one year of accrual of the cause of action, and it therefore did not
state a claim upon ·which relief could be granted.

Under the PCR.i\, a "petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed
within one year after the cause of action has accrued." Utah Code i\nn. § 78B-9~

107(1 ). A cause of action accrues on the latest of the following relevant dates:
(a)

the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;

***
(e)

the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the
petition is based;

Utah Code .Aum. § 78B-9-l 07(2) .
The petition was untimely because it was not filed within one year of entry
of the final judgment. Lopez was sentenced on January 28, 2011. He did not file
an appeal for a trial de novo. Therefore, his case became final on February 28,
2011 ~ the last day for filing an appeal for a trial de novo. Lopez did not file his
petition until September 5~ 2014, more than three (3) years after February 28, 2011,
the last day for filing an appeal and the day which Lopez's cause of action accrued.

6
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B.

The district court property dismissed the petition because it was
plain from the pleadings that the PRCA tolling provisions did not
apply.

ln the district court. Lopez did not dispute that his petition was late, but
argued that the district court should excuse the late filing because the date of
accrual for the cause of action was tolled. Lopez argued that only when he was
hauled into immigration court for removal proceedings did he discover that this
conviction had immigration consequences.

(addendum B).

As a result, Lopez

argues the statute of limitations should be tolled.
The district court reviewed the pleadings along with the official court docket
and determined that there was no basis to toll the statute of limitations in this case.
The official court docket has four different references to immigration. First, on
~ovember 22~ 20 l 0~ at the arraignment~ the Ogden Justice Court's official court
docket states that the defendant has an ICE hold. Secon4 on December 02, 2010,
at a pre-trial conference the official court docket states that the pre-trial conference
is continued because Lopez~s parents "have retained an immigration attorney."
Third, on December 9. 2010, at the continued pre-trial, the official court docket
states that the Lopez "has a bice [sic] hold"

2

.

Finally, on January 28, 2011, at the

scheduled bench trial, the court accepts the proposed plea bargain and sentences
Lopez. The Ogden Justice Court~ s official court docket states that Lopez may be

: 1n the court docket. bice is used instead of ice which seems to be a typo.
7
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released to immigration. The district court based its decision that the limitations
period did not begin to run as soon as Lopez affirmatively knew of the evidemiary
facts forming the basis of his petition, but rather when Lopez '·should have known,.
~

of those facts through the exercise of '·reasonable diligence.,~

As result. there

should be no tolling of the statute of limitations.
Tne district court found that the statute of limitations began to run during
Petitioner·s misdemeanor proceedings before the Ogden City Justice Court OL at
the latest, immediatelv fol1owimr his sentencin2 and not within the last vear when
•

.,I

._,.,

fi,,,.,,,

~

Petitioner began contending remo\'al proceedings. (Aplt. Br., addendum C). The
Court indicated that Lopez must file his petition within one year after "the date on
which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petitioner is base.'· Specifically. the
Court noted that the limitations period does not begin to run as soon as Petitioner
affirmatively knO'ws of the evidentiary facts forming the basis of his petition~ but
rather when the Petitioner '·should have known'~ those facts through the exercise of
"reasonable diligence.,.
v;;

The court referred to the Ogden City Justice's official

court docket regarding Petitioner· s misdemeanor proceedings~ Petitioner was
granted a continuance on December 2~ 2010. because Lopez· s parents retained an
"immigration attorney.'~ The court determined that these official docket entries
represented instances where the Petitioner - through the exercise of diligent efforts

8
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- should have

fu.70V\TI

of the potential of impending immigration concerns that

could accompany his guilty plea.
In Lopez~s petition~ paragraph 11 states that the ~"Statute of Limitations
under G.C.A. 78B-9-107(e:) is tolled because Petitioner first became aware of the
eYidentiary facts on which the petition is based within the past on [sic] year after
reviewing his crii"Ilina1 proceedings with his new counsel. He would have raised
the issues sooneL if not for the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.'~
Furthermore~ paragraph 17 of Lopez~ s petition states Lopez '\\'as not informed
about consequences this guilty plea would have on his immigration status." Also,
paragraph 21 ofLopez·s petition states that the failure ofLopez~s ';public defender
to apprise him of the possible immigration consequences of his guilty [sic] was a
violation of Cesar's constitutional rights.~, These paragraphs are squarely
contradicted by the official court docket.

In paragraph 3 of Lopez~ s petition~ Lopez directly cites to the Ogden City
Justice Court~ s case, fo.us incorporating it into his petition. The Ogden City
Justice Courr· s docket clearly indicates that Lopez was in the custody of ICE
during the Ogden Justice Court case. A continuance was granted since it was
represented to the Justice Court that Lopez's parents had hired an immigration
attorney. \\'hen the case was over, the court released Lopez to immigration. It is a

9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reasonable inference that Lopez knevv' or should have known there \\ ere
7

immigration consequences.
There is a distinction between knowledge of evidentiary facts and
7

appreciation of their legal significance. °Vv ell-established federal case laV\· applying
a similar statute of limitations in the federal habeas corpus context illustrates the
distinction. Under 28 United States Code section 2244, the one-year limitation
period runs from "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.,~ 28
U.S.C. §2244(d) (l)(D). "Factual predicate" under the federal statute is no
different than "evidentiary facts" under the PCR.~.
Under federal case law, the time "begins when the prisoner knows (or
through diligence could discover) the important facts~ not when the prisoner
recognizes their legal sign[ficance. ,. Owens ,·. Boyd~ 23 5 F .3d 3 56~ 3 59 (7th Cir.

2000) (emphasis added). If the habeas statute of limitations "'used a subjective
rather than an objective standard, then there would be no effective time limit.'~ Id.
Therefore~ it is not when Lopez learns that his conviction has immigration
consequences, but rather when Lopez knew, or though reasonable diligence could
have been known~ there were immigration consequences. The facts creating his
~

immigration consequences were either known to Lopez, or through reasonable
diligence could have been known, at the time of sentencing. In this case, Lopez
10
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with reasonable diligence could have timely taken appropriate legal action to
~:

oreserve anv cause of action he mav have had.
J.

II.

ol

.,

THE CITY PROPERLY RAISED THE TIME-BAR DEFENSE IN A
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSU ...\..~T TO RULE 12 A-"l\1D 65C(k) OF
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Lopez argues t.hat the district court erred when it dismissed Lopez~ s petition

wjthout hearing any evidence of whether the tolling provisions applies. Or in other
words.,, on a motion to dismiss. the Court must treat ';the factual a11e£ations in the
,'

complaint as true and consider them, and all reasonable inferences

-.,..

to

be dravm
~'

from them, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.'' St. Benedict ·s Dev. Co. v. St.

Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991 ).
The dismissal should be affirmed because the statute of limitations time bar
defense was properly raised in a motion to dismiss, and the district coUI1 was free
to consider a time-bar defense. The Ci!)-~s motion to dismiss was filed pursuant

to

Rule 12 and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 65C governs
post-conviction relief. It states that "~the respondent shall answer or otherwise

respond." Rule 65C(k) ( emphasis added). The rule then anticipates that the
respondent may fi)e a motion to dismiss - "after service of any motion to dismiss
or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the
motion." Rule 65C(k)).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 11
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FurtheL Rule 12(b) provides that every defense "'shall be asserted in a
responsive pleading thereto if one is required~ except' certain defenses "'may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion." Tnis includes "failure to state a claim
~

upon which relief can be granted.'. In addition: "[a] motion making any of these
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted." Utah R.

vi

Civ. P. 12 (b) ( emphasis added).

The respondent in a post-conviction case~ '~like any other party obligated to
~

file an answer - has the option to assert certain defenses by motion." Maxfield v.
Herbert, 2012 UT 44, r19. 284 P.3d 647. This includes the affirmative defense

that a statute of limitations has expired. Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
2002 lTf 54, ,r8, 53 P.3d 947; Mast v. First Madison Services Inc., 2009 UT App
1

162U. "A complaint showing that the governing statute of limitations has run on
the plaintiffs claim for relief is the most common situation in which the
affLrrr1ative defense appears on the face of the pleading and provides as basis for a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b )(6)." SB Charles .Alan ~ 7right et al.~ Fed. Prac.

& Proc. Ci-v. §1357 (3d ed. 2013).
Utah case law clearly holds that motions to dismiss for failure to state a

claim may raise affirmative defenses when they appear within the complaint.
"'

Tucker, 2002 CT 54; see also Van de Gr[ft v. State, 2013 lJT 11, f23, 299 P.3d

1043; and Foster v. Saunders, 2005 CT App 264U.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 12
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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That is all the City did here. fr1 this case~ the time-bar defense - :hat the
petition was untimely because it was fi1ed beyond the one year statute of
limitations - clearly appeared on the face of the petition. Lopez cites to the case in
paragraph 3 of his petition. As stated previously~ Lopez~s alleges he was not
informed of immigration consequences at the time of his plea. However, the
official court docket clearly indicates that immigration consequences were being
considered since the docket clearlv., indicates a continuance beimr --srranted so an

-

immigration attorney could be consulted. Furthermore, Lopez had an ICE hold
and was released to immisrration after sentencin£.
All reasonable inferences
.._
'-

indicate Lopez knew or should have known there were potential immigration
consequences. These facts clearly contradict his petition.
Furthermore, Lopez· s petition fails to specify when the immigration
consequences were found out. \\7hi1e the official court docket clearly indicates
immigration consequences where being considered, Lopez should have known,
after reasonable diligence~ that there could be immigration consequences. The
facts Lopez relies on existed immediately after sentencing. Lopez had an
opportunity to reasonably and diligently pursue these issues and file an appeal for a
trial de novo or file a PRCA petition within the one year statute of limitations
period.

13
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Further, the PCR..\ rejects the formalistic approach Lopez advocates. It
specifically authorizes the City to "~raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at
any time.,. Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-106(2 ). Likewise~ it authorizes the court to
~

deny relief on time-ba.rred petitions even when the Ciry never raises that defense.

Id.
A motion to dismiss, like- the one filed here~ will better alert a petitioner to

what he needs to do to avoid a time bar. If the City had filed a bare answer, it
would have only had to state, "The petition is untimely.'~ But Lopez knew that his
petition was late. By using a motion to dismiss. the City told Lopez how it
calculated the time and effectively directed him to the tolling provision by pointing
out that he had not asserted that the limitations period was tolled. Lopez did not
add any information for the court to consider in his response to the 1'1otion to
dismiss. For example~ an affidavit that provided more specifics rather than general
allegations of the petition. The time-bar defense was properly raised in a motion to
dismiss and the dismissal should be affirmed.
In addition~ the motion to dismiss was filed under Rule 12 and Rule 65C.
Rule 65C governs post-conviction petitions. and post-conviction petitions are very
different from the notice pleadings in most typical civil cases. Rule 65C states
~

what should be included in a petition. It specifies that, if available, the petitioner
'·shall attach~~ to the petition ''affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in
}4
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support of the aUesm:ions.'· Utah R. Civ. P. 65C (e:>(1 ). In a post-conviction case,
these required attachrnems are part of the pleadii-ig. In considering a motion to
dismiss~ the court may consider items that are deemed to be a part of the complaint,
such as items appearing in the record of the case and attachments to the complaint.

In determining whether to grant a Federal Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
district cotuts primarily consider the allegations in the complaint. The
court is not limited to the four come:-s of the complainL however.
Numerous cases . . . have allowed consideration of matters
incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to
judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the
record of the case~ and exhibits attached to the complaint whose
authenticity is unquestioned: these items may be considered by the
district judge without converting the motion into one for summary
judgment. These matters are deemed to be a part of every complaint
by implication.

5A Charles Alan V\1right & .l\rthur R. :Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,
§1357, see alsoAlvarezv. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987,990, fn6 (Utah 1997). Even if
the post-conviction court cited facts from the c:i.minal record or from items
attached to the petition or motion to dismiss, in a post-conviction case, those items
are part of the pleading.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons~ the Court should affirm the dismissal of the
petition for post-conviction relief.
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Respectfully submitted September 25, 2015.

'V\1m. Greg
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

@

@
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLL\SCE
I certify that in compEance ~·ith Rule 24(f)l 1), l:tah R. App. P -~ this brief
contains 3~889 words, excluding the table of contents~ table of authorities, and
addenda. I further certify that in compliance with rule 27(b\ Utah R. App. P., this
brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using lvficrosoft V\iord
2010 in Times ~ew Roman 14 poiI1t.
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~

Utah Code Ann. iS 788-9-107
S~atutes current tnrough tne 20: 5 General Session

Utah Code Annotated > Title 78B Judicial Code > Chapter 9 Postconviction Remedies Act
> Part 1 General Provisions

78B-9-107 . Statute of limitations for postconviction relief.
(1)

A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petit1or. is filed within one year after the cause of action has
accrued.

(2)

For purposes of tnis section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates:

{a) the last day for filing an appeal from tne entry of the fir.al judgment of conviction. if no apoeai is taker.;

{3)

(4)

(b)

the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is
taken;

{c)

the iast aay for fiiing a petition for wri: of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States
Supreme Court. if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed;

(d)

the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition for
certiorari review. if a petition for wri~ of certiorari is filed:

(e)

the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of
evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; or

{f)

the date on which the new rule described in SubsecUor: 788-9-104( 1) (f! is established.

The iimitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner was prevented from filing a petition
due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity. The
petitioner has the burden of oroving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to
relief under this Subsection (3).
The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome of a petition asserting:

(a)

exoneration through DNA testing under Se:tion 783-9-303; or

{b) factual innocence under Section 788-8-401.
{5)

.Sections 77-19-8, 788-2-104. and 788-2-111 do not extend the limitations period established in this
section.

History
C. 1953. 78-'12-31.1, enacted by L. 1995. ch. 82. S 1; renumbered by L. 1996. ch. 235. l 7: 2004. :;h. 139.
S 2; renumbered by L. 2008. ch. 3. 6 1171; 2008. ch. 288. ~ B; 2008. ch. 358. C 1.
Utah Code Annotated
Copyright © 2015 Matthew Benoe;- & Company, in~. a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
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Utah Code Ann, § 78B-9-106
Statutes current through tne: 2:115 General Sessior,

Utah Code Annotated > Title 78B Judicial Code >
> Part 1 General Provisions

78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief (1)

Chapter 9 Postconviction Remedies Act

Exception.

A person is no: eligibie for relief under this chapter uoon any ground that:

{a)

may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-rr1al motion;

(b)

was raised or addressed at trial or on appeat:

(c)

couid have been bu: was not raised at thal or on appeal:

(d) was :-alsed or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was
not raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or

(e)

is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78S-S-1G7.

{a)

The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, including during the state's
aopea; from an order granting post-conviction relief, unless the court determines that the state should
have raised the time bar or procedural bar at an earlier time.

{b)

Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided that it gives the parties
notice and an opportunity to be heard.

(2)

{3)

Notwithstanding Subsection (1 ){c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have
been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective
assistance of counsel.

(4)

This section authorizes a merits review only to the extent required to address the exception set forth in
Subsection {3).

History
C. 1953, 78-35a-106. enacted by L. 1996. ch. 235. ~ 6: renumbered by L. 2008. ch. 3. cS 1170; 2008. ch. 288.
6 5: 2010. ch. 45. 6 1.
Utah Code Annotated
Copyright ~ 2015 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
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Jason B. Richards #13341
RICHARDS LAW GROL-P~ P.C.
2568 Washington Blvd. Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 781-2026
Facsimiie: (801) 334-9662
Email: jason@jbrla\\ryers.com

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE SECON"D DISTRICT COURT IN _.\...1'/1) FOR
WEBER COD'NTY, STATE OF ULIB
~-

CESAR DA....1\JlEL LOPEZ

)

:MEMORA-~"TilJM LN OPPOSillON

Petitioner,

)

TO OGDEN CITY'S MOTION TO
DIS1v1ISS .A...l\ffi REQUEST FOR

0 R.A.L .A.R.GlJJv.lE!\1TS
)

VS.

OGDEN CITY
Respondent.

)

Case No. 140905670

)

Judge: Ernie W. Jones

~

~

Cesar Daniel Lopez ("Petitioner" or '"Cesar"), by and through counsel undersigned,
submits the following Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent Ogden City's ('~Respondent'')
Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, Petitioner requests that the Court schedule oral arguments on
Respondent~ s Motion.
1. Petitioner filed his Verified Petition for Relief Under fue Post Conviction Remedies Act

(the "Petition") on Septemb_er 5, 2014.

2. The Coun issued an Order on 11/10/2014 ordering Respondent Ogden City to respond to
the Petition.
3. Respondent ftled a Morion to Dismiss the Petition and accompanying memoranda on
12/10/2014.

Firm: 2014102
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4. T.ne due date for Petitioner t0 respond to this Motion was 12/24/2014 and was extended
to 01/091.2015 based on an agreement between the pa.mes.
5. Petitioner filed a second morion to dismiss on 12/26/2014, but it appears that it is idential
to the motion filed on 12/10/2014.
6. Petitioner is essentially alleging three issues in his Petition. First he is alleging that he
was not afforded his rights under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. As a
corollary, because he was not informed of certain constimtional rights his guilty plea was
not entered knowingly and voluntarily.
7. Second, Petitioner is alleging that he was not apprised of the effects this conviction may
have on his immigration status, in violation of his due process rights as outlined in the
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
8. Thir~ Petitioner is alleging that the aforementioned errors primarily occurred because of
inn.effective assistance of his trial counsel.
9. Petitioner alleges that he would have petitioned the court for post-conviction releif
sooner, if not for ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.
10. Petitioner alleges that the statute oflimitations outlined in U.C.A. §78B-9-107(e) is tolled
because Petitioner first became aware of the evidentiary facts on which the petition is
based within the past on year after reviewing his criminal proceedings with his new
counsel. He would have raised the issues sooner, if not for the ineffective assistance of
his trial counsel.

.ARGUMENT
Respondent raises two issues in its Motion. First, Respondent argues that Petitioner's
claims are procedurally barred because he failed to file a notice of appeal, or seek a trial de novo,

2
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a: the district court following his comiction. Second.. Respondent argues that Petitioner's claims

are time-barred under Utah Code A.rm.§ -:'8B-9-107(1f
\\7ben reviewing a motion to dismiss: the Coun must treat '"the facmal allegations in the
complaint as rrue and consider them: and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff': Sr. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d
194: 196 (Utah 1991 ). The Court must then decide that, even if all of the facts contained in the
complaint are true, that the Plaintiff is still not entitled to the relief it seeks. Jd.
Under the Post Conviction Remedies Act ('"PCR..\."), "a person who has been convicted
and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district coun ... for post-conviction
relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence" upon certain grounds. See § 78B-9-104( 1)

§ 78B-9-104 outlines the grounds that a person may challenge their conviction. Primarily, the
Petitioner is seeking a reversal of his conviction because his conviction was obtained in violation
of his constitutional rights. (see~ 20-23 of Petition).

I.

THE PETITIOl\" IS NOT PROCEDlTR..liL Y BA.RR.ED
Respondent argues that the Petition must be dismissed because Petitioner failed to file a
~orice of Appeal in District Court. First, Respondent argues that§ 78B-9-106(c) precludes
petitioner from seelcing relief under the PCR.t\ if it is based on grounds that could have been
raised at trial or on appeal. Se:ondly, Respondent argues that the petitioner must have exhausted
all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal. It is true that, generally, "any issues that were
not addressed on direct appeal but could have been :raised may not be raised for the first time in a
postconviction proceeding absent unusual circumstances." Rudolf v. Galetka, 43 P .3d 467 (Utah
2002). The 2008 amendments to the PRCA effectively rrumped the unusual circumstances test as

~ All future staru.tory references refe:- !O the Utan Code ..,<\rm. uniess indicated otherwise.

Firm:2014102
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outlined by Hurst -r. Caok~ -: . . , P .2d 1029 (Utah~ ~ 989). As stated, and attested to by the
Petitioner. in the Petition, Petitioner did not raise the issues in the trial coun· or on direct appeal
because be did not know the defects existed until weli after the time period to file a morion to
withdraw his plea or to file a notice of appeal had expired. Therefore, pursuant to § 77-13-6( c),
Petitioner~ s only recourse to challenge his guilty plea is through the PCRA... (Stating that ''any
challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be
pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.) Respondenf s moving papers do not address the ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.
Essentially, Respondent's argument is foreclosed by§ 78B-9-106(3). Respondent's
position is that Petitioner cannot seek relief through the PCRA because he should have raised the
issues at a trial de novo or on appeal.§ 78B-9-106(3) states: "Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c),
a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised
at trial or on appeat if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of
counsel." Petitioner states that he would have sought redress of his conviction through an appealbut, due to the ineffectiveness of his counsel~ he did not. Petitioner should have the opportunity
to present evidence of I. the impact this conviction had on his immigration status and 2. that he
would have sought redress of the conviction through the normal channel of a trial de novo if not
for the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. Petitioenr also alleges that at the time of the entering
of his plea, he was not informed of his rights under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Specifically, Cesar was not informed of his right to a public trial, his right to
·withdraw his guilty plea, and that the guilty plea may impact his immigration status. As the
plaintiff, Petitioner should be afforded the benefit of the doubt and be allowed to have his day in
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court.
Respondenfs reliance on Lucero v. Kennard: 2005 "CT 79: 125 P.3d 9i; J:tah 2005) is
misplaced and the case at bar is distinguishable. In Lucero, a justice court defendant attacked his
conviction through the PCR.A because he was denied his right to counsel in the justice coun
proceedings. Because be appeared pro se at the trial level, the exceptions to the preclusions to
relief outlined in § 78B-9-106(3) were not invoked. The Court in Luceo held that "when a
defendant elects to proceed pro se, is convicted, and subsequently attacks the conviction or
sentence based on a deprivation of the right to counsel, the court must determine whether the
defendant exercised the •right to self-representation voluntarily: knowingly~ and intelligently."'

Id. quoting: in pan Relief Available for Violation of Right to Counsel at Sentencing in State
Criminal Trial, 65 A.LR.4th 183 (2004). In this case, Cesar was represented by counsel and his
petition alleges that, due to the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, his constitutional rights were
violated. That alone is enough to overcome the procedural hurdles imposed by the PCRA.. and is
enough to overcome Respondenf s motion to dismiss.

II.

PETITIO:N-:ER'S CLAIMS ARE NOT TIME BARRED "C:N""DER § 78B-9-107(1).
Respondent argues that Petitioner~ s claims are time-barred because the petition was not filed

within the statute oflimitations period as outlined in§ 78B-9-107(1). The law states '"a petitioner
is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of action has
accrued." Id. § 78B-9-107(2) defines when a cause of action has "accrued": For the purposes of
this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the
case, if an appeal is taken;
c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court
or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed;

Firm: 2014102
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(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for \vrit of certiorari or the entry of the
decision on the petition for certiorari review~ if a petition for writ of certiorari is
filed;
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have kno\'\~ in the exercise of
reasonable diligence~ of evidentiary facts on whicn the petition is based
Petitioner bas alleged that he first became aware of the evidentiary facts upon which the petition
is based within the last year when he was haled in from of immigration court for removal
proceedings. Petitioner has alleged that only then did he discover that this conviction contained
immigration consequences that were not disclosed to him by his triai counsel. Petitioner has
alleged that only then did he discover the irregularities of bis conviction. Therefore based on the
allegations of the Petition, the facts of which were personally verified by the Petitioner, the oneyear statute of limitations has not expireQ because Petitioner became aware of the evidentiary
facts upon which his petition is based within the last year, as subsection (e) anticipates.
Because Petitioner filed his petition within the last year, he is well within the statute of
limitations. As stated above, when revievling a motion to dismiss, the Court must treat "the
factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St.

Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). The Court must then decide that, "even if all
of the facts contained in the complaint are true, that the Plaintiff is still not entitled to the relief it
seeks." Id. Respondent correctly argues that it is Petitioner's burden to disprove the existence of
preclusion to relief under the PCRA by a preponderance of the evidence. Again, when reviewing
a case at the dismissal stage, the Court must take what the Plaintiff is alleging at face value.
Petitioner states that he first became aware of the constitutional defect in this conviction within
the last year, and has attested to such in his Petition. The Respondent has offered no substantive
allegation that this is not the case. The Court can only make a determmation about what the

6
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Petitioner should have

kn0Vv11

after hearing evidence. Again~ the task the Court is given he:re is

whether or noL on its face, Petitioner~ s claims entitle him to relief. The Court has already made a
determination that the petition is not frivolous and has genuine issues of material fact. Taken at
face value, the Court must assume that Petitioner first learned about the constitutional problems

·with bis conviction within the last year. Petitioner can only further establish his case by
presenting evidence.

CONCLUSION
The Respondent is aslcing the Court to dismiss petitioner's claims without hearing any
evidence. As stated previously, the Coun must treat "the factual allegations in the complaint as
true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be draw-u from them in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff.'' St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P .2d 194, 196
(Utah 1991). Utah Courts have consistently held that a dismissal is "a severe measure and should
be granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any state
of facts which could be proved in support of its claim." Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121
Utah 457, 460, 243 P.2d 441, 443 (1952). Courts exist as a forum for settling controversies, and
"if there is any doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis,
the issue should be resolved in favor of giving the pany an opportunity to present its prooC'

Baur v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 14 Utah 2d 283,284, 383 P .2d 397, 397 (1963). Finally, when
reviewing a motion to dismiss the court must accept the material allegations of the complaint as
true" Petersen v. Jones, 16 Utah 2d 121, 122, 396 P.2d 748, 748 (1964).
Petitioner has alleged that, due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, that his
constitutional rights were violated. He is now facing imminent depor:ration because of this
conviction and be bas alleged that he first became aware of these violations and defects within

Ffrm: 2014102
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the last year. Petitioner has substantial rigbts on the line that can oniy be properly presented to
the Court through e,idence.
"\X.lIEREFORE, Petitioner asks that the Conn deny Respondent's Morion and gjve him
his day TIJ. Court. Furthermore, Petitioner requests that the Court scheduled oral arguments on
Respondem:s motion at a time that is converuent for the coun and all panies.
DATED this 8th day of January 2015.

RlCH..A.RDS LAW GROUP, P.C.

/s/ Jason B. Richards
JASON B. RICH.A.RDS
Anorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SER\i1CE
th

I certify that on the 8 day of January 2015 I delivered a nue and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMOR.A.NTilJM IN OPPOSITION TO OGDEN CITY'S MOTION TO DISMrSS
.A....~"D REQUEST FOR OR.A.l ARGlJME:!\'TS was served electronically, via email~ on the below
named attorneys pursuant to UCJA Rule 4-503.
Wm. Gregory Burdett
Michael S. Junk
Isl Jason B. Richards
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